The Navy Changed 85% of Its “Proven” Frigate

The first Constellation frigate is now due in 2029, three years later than planned. The delay is only one part of the problem. The ship has also moved far from the design the Navy chose to reduce risk.

That should give taxpayers pause.

The Constellation frigate is being built in Wisconsin by Fincantieri Marinette Marine. The United States Navy began work on the program in 2020, using a French and Italian frigate design from the 2000s. The design had been used by the French Navy and Italian Navy.

The plan sounded simple. Start with a ship that already existed. Change what the Navy needed. Build it in the United States.

But the plan did not stay simple.

Design changes submitted to the Navy in 2021 and 2022 were rejected. The shipyard had to return to the drawing board. By 2024, 85% of the parent design had been removed and replaced with new changes.

At that point, the word “based” no longer tells us enough. The Navy began with a foreign design, then changed most of it. The promised benefit was speed and lower risk. The result has been delay and rising cost.

“The Constellation frigate has been delayed to 2029,” the narrator said.

That date matters because a warship is not a normal construction project. A late office building is an inconvenience. A late naval ship leaves a gap in the fleet plan. It can force older ships to serve longer. It can push sailors, repairs, and money into a system that already has little room to spare.

The Navy first faced a one-year delay as of January 2024. In March 2025, the delay grew to three years. The delivery of Constellation Frigate Hall One moved out to 2029, instead of 2027.

The price has moved too.

Costs for the Constellation frigate are skyrocketing and going over budget. As of 2025, $3 billion of a $5.5 billion fixed-cap contract had been spent on the program. The broader figure tied to the program is $6.6 billion.

A fixed-price contract is meant to give the government some protection from cost growth. It does not make waste disappear. It also does not repair a design that keeps changing. When work begins before the plans are ready, the bill can rise through redesign, rework, delay, and dispute.

The keel for the first hull was laid in 2024. That unlocked more funding for Hall 2 construction. The work has therefore continued, even as the design and schedule problems have grown.

This is where the record becomes harder to separate from judgment.

Rear Admiral Tom Anderson has been in charge of the Constellation program since 2019 as the PEO of Ships. He also managed the Littoral Combat Ship program. That program suffered from major cost overruns and technical problems.

The documented issue is not that one person caused every problem. Shipbuilding failures rarely fit that neatly. The fair question is whether the Navy changed its process after the LCS experience, or whether it carried the same habits into a new program.

The answer, so far, is troubling.

The Constellation program shows many of the same warning signs. The Navy selected a design to limit risk. It ordered major changes. It moved ahead as the design was still changing. It then absorbed delay and cost growth.

What remains unknown is just as important. The available facts do not prove that Anderson’s leadership caused the current problems. They do not show whether the Navy could have avoided the delays with different decisions in 2021 or 2022. They also do not settle whether the completed frigate will meet its planned military needs when it finally reaches the fleet.

Those questions deserve clear answers, not a search for one person to blame.

The company’s role must also be kept in view. Fincantieri Marinette Marine is building the ship in Wisconsin, but the Navy chose the parent design and approved the changes. The public record described here does not establish that the shipyard alone caused the program’s delays or rising costs.

That distinction matters. A contractor can make mistakes. A government can also create the conditions for those mistakes by changing requirements late and starting construction too soon.

The ordinary cost is easy to miss. Billions spent on a delayed ship are billions unavailable for other ships, repairs, training, or pay. The Navy may still receive a useful frigate. But a useful ship delivered late and at a far higher cost can leave the fleet weaker than the original plan promised.

I do not think the lesson is that the Navy should never adapt a foreign design. Nor is the lesson that every troubled program should be abandoned at the first sign of trouble. Military ships must meet American rules and carry American systems.

The lesson is narrower, and harder to ignore. If the Navy says it is buying a proven design, it should protect the parts that make the design proven. If it changes 85% of the ship, it should admit that it is managing a new design and budget the work that way.

The Constellation frigate began as an effort to save time. It has now spent years giving time back. The Navy still owes the public a plain account of how that happened, what the $6.6 billion has bought, and what it expects the first ship to do when 2029 arrives.